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Ellis v. Northern Star Co.: Libel in a Business Setting Subject
to Mandatory Treble Damages Under North Carolina General
Statutes Sections 75-1.1 and 75-16
In the United States, commercial activities take place in a market system in
which private buyers and sellers trade money for goods and services. Federal
and state governments provide structure and order to the market system
through selective regulation. The realm of regulation includes prohibitions
against unfair competition and trade practices. In North Carolina, General
Statutes section 75-1.11 stands at the center of the law of unfair competition and
trade practices. Section 75-1.1, enacted in 1969,2 is enforceable in a private
damage action brought by an aggrieved competitor or consumer; the accompa-
nying section 75-16 provides automatic trebling of damages awarded in such an
action. 3 To establish a violation of section 75-1.1, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant engaged in "[u]nfair methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce."'4 The statutory language of section
75-1.1 does not delineate the scope of its protection; rather, the courts define the
parameters of the statute through the process of "judicial inclusion and
exclusion. ''5
In Ellis v. Northern Star Co. 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court broadened
the realm of protection provided by section 75-1.1 by holding that libel per se in
a business setting constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice in or affecting com-
mercb in violation of the section.7 The significance of this holding stems from
the automatic treble damages that accompany a violation of section 75-1.1,8
whereas the common-law remedy for libel per se consists merely of actual and
punitive damages.9 This extension of the protective shield of section 75-1.1 oc-
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988). Section 75-1.1 provides, in pertinent part, that "[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. § 75-1.1(a). For a thorough discussion of § 75-1.1,
see Aycock, North Carolina Law on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C.L. REv. 205, 210-23
(1982).
2. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988)).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988). Section 75-16 provides:
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation shall
be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person,
firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm or
corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if
damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
Id.
4. Id. § 75-1.1(a). For the text of section 75-1.1(a), see supra note 1.
5. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931); see infra text accompa-
nying note 58.
6. 326 N.C. 219, 388 S.E.2d 127 (1990).
7. Id. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131. For the North Carolina common-law definition of libel per
se, see infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 227, 388 S.E.2d at 132.
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curred with minimal justification by the court, 10 and despite a strong dissent
that the communication in question was not even a libel per se.11
This Note analyzes the Ellis decision's broadening of section 75-1.1 in light
of prior case law concerning libel per se in a business context and unfair trade
practices. The analysis includes a comparison of the North Carolina unfair
trade practices scheme with that used in several major jurisdictions. This Note
concludes that the expansion of section 75-1.1 in Ellis was not well supported,
and was a step towards over-restriction of commercial transactions.
Ellis Brokerage Company, Inc. (Ellis Brokerage) was a North Carolina
food broker that served as a middleman between large-quantity food buyers,
such as hospitals and school systems, and food producers. 12 The defendant,
Northern Star Company (Northern Star), was a potato processor based in Min-
nesota and a client of Ellis Brokerage since 1981.13 Between 1981 and 1986 Ellis
Brokerage increased Northern Star's annual sales in eastern North Carolina
from zero to approximately $640,000.14
On June 20, 1986, Earl Ellis, the only full-time employee of Ellis Brokerage,
received Northern Star potato pricing information over the telephone from
Thomas Kenney, Northern Star's senior vice president for sales.' 5 On June 23
Ellis sent price lists based on the information to several potential buyers. 16 By a
letter dated August 29, 1986, Kenney notified Ellis that Northern Star was ter-
minating its brokerage arrangement with Ellis Brokerage. 17 Finally, on Septem-
ber 5 Kenney sent a letter to several of the buyers who received the June 23 price
list from Ellis Brokerage.18 The letter contained the following language:
We have recently received copies of a price list sent to you from
Ellis Brokerage Company regarding pricing on Northern Star potato
products. These prices were noted for bids only, delivered by Northern
Star.
We at Northern Star Company did not authorize such a price list
and therefore cannot honor the prices as quoted on June 23, 1986.19
On the basis of this letter, Earl Ellis and Ellis Brokerage sued Northern Star and
Thomas Kenney individually.20
The plaintiffs' original action asserted that the letter of September 5, 1986,
was "libelous per se and an unfair or deceptive act affecting commerce" in viola-
10. Id. at 225-26, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
11. Id. at 228-31, 388 S.E.2d at 132-34 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 221, 388 S.E.2d at 128.
13. Id. at 221, 388 S.E.2d at 128-29.
14. Id. at 221-22, 388 S.E.2d at 129. Ellis Brokerage received a 3% commission for orders
brokered on behalf of Northern Star. Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 4, Ellis (No. 192PA89). Com-
missions from Northern Star constituted "at least 80% of [the] commissions" of Ellis Brokerage. Id.
15. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 221-22, 388 S.E.2d at 128-29.
16. Id. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129.
17. Id.; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, Ellis (No. 192PA89).
18. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129.
19. Id.; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14, Ellis (No. 192PA89).
20. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129.
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tion of section 75-1.1.21 The plaintiffs amended their complaint to include alle-
gations of "breach of a covenant of good faith, breach of contract through
unreasonable termination, tortious interference with business relations, and un-
just enrichment .... The defendants counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty
and breach of contract."'22 Earl Ellis's testimony at trial included a discussion
he had with a customer of Ellis Brokerage who received the Northern Star letter,
stating that the customer "was going to look for other sources to get his potatoes
because he didn't know whether he could trust me or Northern Star."'2 3 The
jury found that the defendants had libeled Ellis Brokerage and awarded $32,500
in compensatory damages and $12,500 in punitive damages.24 The trial court,
however, granted the defendants' motions for directed verdicts on all other
claims, including the defendants' alleged violation of section 75-1.1.25
Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the decision of the trial court and
the North Carolina Supreme Court considered two issues: whether the North-
ern Star letter of September 5, 1986, was libelous per se, as found by the jury,
and whether libel per se of a plaintiff relating to its business "constitutes an
unfair or deceptive act affecting commerce in violation of" section 75-1.1.26 The
supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that the letter was libelous per se,
rejecting the defendants' argument that the letter was "not defamatory at all or,
alternatively... susceptible of both defamatory and nondefamatory interpreta-
tions." 27 Justice Mitchell, writing for the court, stated that "[w]hether a publi-
cation is one of the type that properly may be deemed libelous per se is a
question of law to be decided initially by the trial court," and he asserted that
the trial court properly decided that issue.28 After that step, the jury must de-
cide if the publication was actually libelous per se, and the supreme court agreed
with the jury's affirmative resolution of that issue in this case.29 The court, how-
ever, was not unanimous on the issue of libel per se. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Meyer, joined by Justice Whichard, stated that the "defendant's letter
was clearly not defamatory per se, and the issue should not have been submitted
to the jury."30
The court then considered an issue of first impression: whether libel per se
in a business setting is an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of sec-
tion 75-1.1.31 In holding that libel per se of this type is within the realm of
section 75-1.1, the court analogized libel per se in a business setting to false
21. Id.
22. Id. The parties settled the breach of contract claim and counterclaim prior to trial. Id.
23. Id. at 224, 388 S.E.2d at 130.
24. Id. at 222, 227, 388 S.E.2d at 129, 132. The jury found that "the defendants had not libeled
the individual plaintiff Earl Ellis." Id. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129.
25. Id. at 222, 338 S.E.2d at 129.
26. Id. at 221, 388 S.E.2d at 128.
27. Id. at 224, 388 S.E.2d at 130. For "words to be libelous perse [they] must be susceptible of
but one meaning." Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 786, 195 S.E. 55, 60 (1938).
28. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 224, 388 S.E.2d at 130; see Flake, 212 N.C. at 785, 195 S.E. at 59.
29. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 224-25, 388 S.E.2d at 130-31.
30. Id. at 230, 388 S.E.2d at 134 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 225-26, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
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advertising and fraud, both of which the court previously had found to violate
the statute.32 Because libel per se in a business setting did not fall within the
category of "transactions already subject to pervasive and intricate statutory
regulation,"' 33 the court summarily deemed it to be an act in violation of section
75-1.1, justifying an award of treble damages under section 75-16.34 The court
applied this decision to the facts at hand and decided that the trial court erred in
granting the defendants' motion for directed verdicts on the unfair trade practice
claim.35 Because the defendants' act violated section 75-1.1, and since the jury
found that Ellis Brokerage suffered actual damages to its business reputation
caused by the libel, the court directed the jury on remand to award Ellis Broker-
age a choice of damages: $32,500 in actual damages automatically trebled to a
sum of $97,500 under section 75-16, or the previously calculated libel award of
$45,000.36
As a backdrop to analysis of the Ellis decision, North Carolina law covering
trade libel, defamation, and unfair trade practices will be discussed. The doc-
trine of trade libel, or disparagement, provides a common-law cause of action for
injured plaintiffs engaged in business in North Carolina, as well as a number of
other jurisdictions.3 7 One definition of the cause of action is as follows:
[D]isparagement... may consist of the publication of matter deroga-
tory to the plaintiff's title to his property, or its quality, or to his busi-
ness in general, or even to some element of his personal affairs, of a
kind calculated to prevent others from dealing with him, or otherwise
to interfere with his relations with others to his disadvantage.3 s
The development of the trade libel cause of action in North Carolina
reached its peak in the 1942 case of Carolina Aniline & Extract Co. v. Ray.39 In
Carolina Aniline, the plaintiff sold almost its entire production operation to the
defendant, then purchased new equipment and continued its business at another
location.4° The defendant wrote the plaintiff's customers letters that explained
the purchase, stated that it would "manufacture identically the same products
under [its] own trade names," and directly compared its lower prices with those
of the plaintiff.4 1 The plaintiff alleged that the letters were "false, deceptive and
32. Id. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131; see infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
33. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131. The court previously applied this limitation to
securities transactions in Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241
(1985); see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
34. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 226, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 227-28, 388 S.E.2d at 132; see supra note 24 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs may
elect to recover either punitive damages under a common-law claim or treble damages under § 75-
16, but not both. See Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modified
and aff'd, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
37. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. Other names for the tort of trade libel
include "injurious falsehood," "commercial disparagement," "disparagement of property," and
"slander of goods." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 128, at 962-63 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter LAW OF TORTS].
38. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 128, at 967.
39. 221 N.C. 269, 20 S.E.2d 59 (1942).
40. Id. at 270, 20 S.E.2d at 60.
41. Id. at 270-71, 20 S.E.2d at 60.
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intended to deceive and did deceive plaintiff's customers." 42 In reversing the
trial court's grant of nonsuit for the defendant, the court expressed the rationale
that unfair competition occurrs whenever "'the public is likely to be
deceived.' "43 The court clarified very little about the trade libel cause of action,
however, and did not even label the action by any of the traditional phrases such
as "trade libel", "disparagement", or "injurious falsehood". 44 Since Carolina
Aniline, the cause of action for disparagement has not developed and injured
plaintiffs in similar circumstances instead have pursued a cause of action for
defamation.45
Defamation is that which tends "to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill
or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or
unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." 46 North Carolina courts recognize
three categories of defamatory material:
(1) Publications which are obviously defamatory and which are
termed libels per se; (2) publications which are susceptible of two rea-
sonable interpretations, one of which is defamatory and the other is
not; and (3) publications which are not obviously defamatory, but
which become so when considered in connection with innuendo, collo-
quium and explanatory circumstances.4 7
Furthermore,
a publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered
alone without innuendo: (1) It charges that a person has committed
an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious
disease; (3) it tends to subject one to ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or
(4) it tends to impeach one in his trade or profession. 48
The courts have interpreted the fourth category of libel per se, applied in
Ellis, in a number of cases. In Badame v. Lampke,4 9 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant, a direct competitor, spoke words over the telephone to a customer
that implied that the plaintiff engaged in "shady deals," and thereby impaired
the plaintiff's business reputation.50 Holding that the words spoken by the de-
fendant were actionable per se for "charg[ing] the plaintiff with a dishonorable
42. Id. at 270, 20 S.E.2d at 60.
43. Id. at 272, 20 S.E.2d at 61 (quoting 63 C.J. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Compe-
tition § 112, at 415 (1933)).
44. One point of clarification made by the court was the following:
[I]n order to escape liability for unfair competition, statements made for the purpose of
inducing a competitor's customers to purchase the advertiser's products by making the
express statement that his products'possess all the qualities of the products of another...
must be true, or the injured party will be entitled to relief.
Id.
45. See Comment, Unfair Competition-Law of Unfair Competition in North Carolina, 46
N.C.L. REV. 856, 877-78 (1968). For a discussion of Carolina Aniline and the status of the dispar-
agement cause of action in North Carolina, see id. at 874-78.
46. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 111, at 773.
47. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 785, 195 S.E. 55, 59 (1938).
48. Id. at 787, 195 S.E. at 60.
49. 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955).
50. Id. at 755-56, 89 S.E.2d at 467.
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course of business conduct,"15 1 the supreme court noted that the words "must
contain an imputation necessarily hurtful in its effect on [the plaintiff's] busi-
ness." 52 More recently, in Matthews, Cremins, McLean, Inc. v. Nichter,s 3 the
court of appeals held that letters sent by defendant media buying service to tele-
vision stations, which asserted that the plaintiff advertising agency breached its
contract and failed to pay its bills, were libelous per se.54 The court's rationale
was that the communication of such assertions to third parties "clearly tend[ed]
to disparage plaintiff's integrity in its business dealings."s"
While the trade libel and defamation causes of action exist within the com-
mon law of North Carolina, the law of unfair trade practices flourishes within
the confines of North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.1. In 1977 the
general assembly amended the original language of section 75-1.156 in order to
conform to the exact wording of its federal counterpart, section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.57 Rather than enumerate a list of specific illegal acts,
practices, and methods of competition, the general assembly chose to follow
Congress's definition in "adopt[ing] a phrase which.., does not 'admit of pre-
cise definition, but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by
what [the Supreme Court] elsewhere has called "the gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion."' ".58
The North Carolina Supreme Court examined section 75-1.1 for the first
time in Hardy v. Toler.5 9 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
automobile dealer made false representations concerning the condition of a car
at the time of purchaseA0 In holding that as a matter of law the false representa-
tions made by defendant to plaintiff violated section 75-1.1,61 the court noted
that "[s]ome guidance may be obtained by reference to federal decisions on ap-
peals from the Federal Trade Commission since the language of [section] 75-1.1
closely parallels that of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 62 The court also
51. Id. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at 468.
52. Id.
53. 42 N.C. App. 184, 256 S.E.2d 261, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 569, 261 S.E.2d 123 (1979).
54. Id. at 188, 256 S.E.2d at 264.
55. Id. For other North Carolina cases dealing with the business impeachment category of libel
per se, see, eg., Lay v. Gazette Publishing Co., 209 N.C. 134, 183 S.E. 416 (1936) (libel per se found
when a newspaper incorrectly published that the plaintiff was the leader of a strike and had been
arrested for trespassing); Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935) (statement by butcher
that his competitor had slaughtered a cow bitten by a mad dog was defamatory per se); U v. Duke
Univ., 91 N.C. App. 171, 371 S.E.2d 701 (statements by defendant to plaintiff's colleague that plain-
tiff was a liar, deceitful, absolutely useless, and a fraud impeached plaintiff in his profession and were
slanderous per se), disc rev. denied, 323 N.C. 629, 374 S.E.2d 590 (1988); Talbert v. Mauney, 80
N.C. App. 477, 343 S.E.2d 5 (1986) (allegations that president of bank published statements imput-
ing that plaintiff forged his letters of credit and was a drug dealer alleged slander per se).
56. Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, §§ 1-2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988)). For the amended text of § 75-1.1(a), see supra note 1.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
58. Federal Trade Comm'n v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 312 (1934) (quoting Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)).
59. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
60. Id. at 304, 218 S.E.2d at 343.
61. Id. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347.
62. Id. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 345.
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established the bifurcated process used in cases under section 75-1.1, whereby
"the jury... determine[s] the facts, and based on the jury's finding, the court...
determine[s] as a matter of law whether the defendant engaged in unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce."'63
In Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.,64 plaintiff real estate de-
velopers alleged that the defendant mortgage broker and mortgagor "entered
into a deliberate course of conduct which was designed to force [the plaintiff]
into an untenable economic position so that it would be unable to complete" the
development of a shopping center.65 The court provided some guidance on the
scope of section 75-1.1 by stating that "[w]hat is an unfair or deceptive trade
practice usually depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice
has in the marketplace." 66 Furthermore, a practice is unfair when it "offends
established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, op-
pressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers," 67 or when it
"amounts to an inequitable assertion of [a party's] power or position." 68 The
court applied these guidelines to the defendants' conduct and concluded that it
was not unfair or deceptive.69
The court made two significant points in Marshall v. Miller,70 an action by
a consumer for misrepresentation. First, the court held that the intent or good
faith belief of a party is irrelevant to the determination of the unfairness or de-
ceptiveness of a particular act.7 1 Second, the court justified automatic treble
damages. While discussing section 75-16 and treble damages, the court con-
cluded that "[a]bsent statutory language making trebling discretionary with the
trial judge.., the Legislature intended trebling of any damages assessed to be
automatic once a violation [of section 75-1.1] is shown."7 2 The rationale offered
for the automatic trebling scheme under section 75-16 was that "it makes more
economically feasible the bringing of an action where the possible money dam-
ages are limited, and thus encourages private enforcement" and "it increases the
incentive for reaching a settlement."173
The court limited the application of section 75-1.1 in Skinner v. E.F. Hutton
& Co.,74 when it held that because securities transactions "'were already subject
63. Id. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47.
64. 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
65. Id. at 251, 266 S.E.2d at 614. The defendants' course of conduct included the tendering of
a mortgage for the shopping center, which was conditioned on the plaintiffs' ability to secure an
interim construction loan as well as particular lease commitments. Id. at 250, 266 S.E.2d at 613.
When the plaintiffs failed to obtain the construction loan or a lease commitment from a bank, the
defendant mortgagor terminated the mortgage. Id. at 251, 266 S.E.2d at 614.
66. Id. at 262-63, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
67. Id. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621. The court also noted that "[t]he concept of 'unfairness' is
broader than and includes the concept of 'deception."' Id.
68. Id. at 264, 266 S.E.2d at 622.
69. Id. at 266, 266 S.E.2d at 623.
70. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
71. Id. at 548-49, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
72. Id. at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
73. Id. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04.
74. 314 N.C. 267, 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985).
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to pervasive and intricate regulation under the North Carolina Securities Act, as
well as the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,'"
they were beyond the scope of the statute.75 The judicial exclusion of transac-
tions subject to statutory regulation apart from section 75-1.1 reflected the
court's concern for over-penalizing a party already subject to sanctions.7 6
The court attempted to interpret "commerce," as used in section 75-1.1(b),
in Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc.7 7 For legislative intent, the court
looked to the original version of section 75-1.1(b), which applied to "dealings
between persons engaged in business, and between persons engaged in business
and the consuming public."'78 The court noted that "individual consumers are
not the only ones protected" by the language of the statute,79 but found that
"section [75-1.1(b)] is not broad enough... to encompass 'all forms of business
activities.' -80
The development of North Carolina law on libel and unfair trade practices
converged in the Ellis decision. The first question answered by the court in Ellis
concerned the libelous nature of the letter mailed by defendant Northern Star.81
Arguably, plaintiff Ellis Brokerage could have brought a common-law action for
trade libel or disparagement. After all, the plaintiff's libel per se claim, which
was premised on injury to its business relationships with customers allegedly
caused by Northern Star's letter, appears to fit within the definition of disparage-
ment.82 The failure of the plaintiff to raise this cause of action in an appropriate
fact scenario testifies to the lifeless state of the disparagement cause of action in
North Carolina, 83 despite its viability in other jurisdictions. 84
75. Id. at 275, 333 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d
162, 167 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)); see also Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38
N.C. App. 414, 420-21, 248 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1978) (commodities transactions not within the scope
of § 75-1.1 due to the existence of a federal scheme of regulation), disc rev. denied, 296 N.C. 583,
254 S.E.2d 32 (1979).
76. Skinner, 314 N.C. at 274, 333 S.E.2d at 241 ("[A]pplication of the statute ... would expose
a party violating the statute to a host of legislatively created sanctions in addition to those sought in
the private action.").
77. 81 N.C. App. 1, 22-23, 344 S.E.2d 82, 94-95 (1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987). Section 75-1.1(b) provides: "For purposes of this
section, 'commerce' includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include pro-
fessional services rendered by a member of a learned profession." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b)
(1988).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1969). The original version of § 75-1.1(b) provided:
The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain,
ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business, and between persons
engaged in business and the consuming public within this State, to the end that good faith
and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this State.
Id.
79. Olivetti, 81 N.C. App. at 23, 344 S.E.2d at 95.
80. Id. at 22, 344 S.E.2d at 94 (quoting Threatt v. Hiers, 76 N.C. App. 521, 523, 333 S.E.2d
772, 773 (1985), disc rev. denied, 315 N.C. 397, 338 S.E.2d 887 (1986)).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
82. See supra text accompanying note 38.
83. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIA-
TION, STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW NC-14 (1991) [hereinafter UNFAIR
COMPETITION] ("There are no reported decisions on [the] subject [of trade disparagement or trade
libel] by North Carolina courts.").
84. See infra text accompanying note 124.
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In the absence of a body of common law on disparagement on which to
rely, Ellis Brokerage brought a successful action for libel per se. The supreme
court provided the following explanation for its affirmation of the trial court's
finding of libel per se:
The language "[w]e at Northern Star did not authorize such a price
list," taken in the context of the entire letter, can only be read to mean
that Ellis Brokerage Company, acting in its capacity as broker for
Northern Star, did an unauthorized act. Whether that act was pub-
lishing certain unauthorized prices within a price list or publishing the
entire price list itself without authorization is of no import; either read-
ing is defamatory and impeaches Ellis Brokerage in its trade as a food
broker.8 5
It is not entirely clear why this language is defamatory and impeaching. As
pointed out by Justice Meyer in his dissenting opinion, the language in question,
"when read by a typical recipient of [the] letter, could very reasonably be inter-
preted to mean that there was a simple breakdown in communications or an
inadvertent mistake in the price list through the fault of either or both par-
ties."18 6 If the accusation that a food broker acted without authority connotes a
lack of scrupulous business practices or integrity in the eyes of its customers,
and the customers have come to expect those qualities from the broker, the case
for libel per se is clear. If the defendant communicated an accusation of re-
peated mistakes in price listings or habitual unauthorized listings on the part of
the plaintiff, there is also a sound basis for a libel per se claim.8 7
In this case, however, Northern Star's letter "does not rise to the level of
accusing [Ellis Brokerage] of incompetence or untrustworthiness, nor would a
typical buyer automatically reach that conclusion." 's Whereas the findings of
libel per se in Badame, Matthews, and other North Carolina cases dealing with
defamation in a business context8 9 were based on language "contain[ing] an im-
putation which [was] necessarily harmful in its effect on plaintiffs' business," 90
Justice Meyer presented a strong argument that the court's finding in Ellis did
not rest on so solid a foundation. 91 Conversely, Justice Mitchell, writing for the
majority, provided scant justification for the holding, thereby accepting a mini-
mal standard for finding libel per se in a business setting. While this part of the
court's holding is of only secondary importance, it is noteworthy for the shadow
that it casts over business communications.
The substance of Ellis lies in the supreme court's treatment of the question
of first impression whether libel per se is an unfair or deceptive trade practice in
violation of section 75-1.1. The court emphasized that the existence of "perva-
85. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 224, 388 S.E.2d at 130.
86. Id. at 229, 388 S.E.2d at 133 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
89. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
90. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 229, 388 S.E.2d at 133 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur courts have tended to recognize more blatantly deroga-
tory statements than the one at issue here as defamatory per se in the business context."); see supra
note 55.
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sive and intricate statutory regulation" for a particular type of transaction would
provide an exception to the protective shield of section 75-1.1, but that no such
limitation applied to libel per se of a type impeaching a party in its business.92
While the court did not explain the exception, the probable rationale is that an
injured plaintiff would have a sufficient avenue of recourse under the specifically
tailored statutory regulation and would not need the protections of section 75-
1.1. 93 Although libel per se is not addressed by statute in North Carolina, it is
the subject of a well-developed common-law cause of action.94 As in Ellis, a
plaintiff who can show that an injury was proximately caused by a libelous state-
ment likely will receive compensatory and punitive damages.95 Common law, in
this instance, thus provides as effective and sufficient a remedy for the injured
party as statutory regulation provides in the securities arena.96 A party suing
for libel has the option of selecting higher damages under section 75-1.1 and the
accompanying section 75-16, while a plaintiff injured under a statutorily regu-
lated transaction is limited to actual and compensatory damages.97 The com-
mon-law protection from libel is pervasive, like that of a statutory scheme, and
logically the court should exclude libel per se from protection under section 75-
1.1.
As further justification for the categorization of libel per se in a business
setting as an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of section 75-1.1, the
Ellis court pointed out that both false advertising and fraud had been found to
violate the statute.9s The court cited a fraud case, Hardy v. Toler,99 in which a
plaintiff consumer recovered under sections 75-1.1 and 75-16 for misrepre-
sentations made by the defendant automobile dealer at the time of purchase of a
car. 10 0 The court also cited a false advertising case, Winston Realty Co. v.
G.H. G., Inc.,11 in which the plaintiff corporation hired the defendant personnel
agency for the purpose of filling a bookkeeping position.10 2 The plaintiff filled
the position with someone who ultimately embezzled $24,000 and committed
92. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
93. Additionally, it would be inequitable to penalize a defendant already subject to statutory
sanctions. The court employed such reasoning in cases involving securities and commodities trans-
actions. See Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 274, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985) (securities
transactions); Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38 N.C. App. 414, 420-21, 248 S.E.2d 567,
570 (1978) (commodities transactions), disc rev. denied, 296 N.C. 583, 254 S.E.2d 32 (1979).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
95. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 130-31.
96. This result occurs notwithstanding the legislative intent behind the enactment of § 75-1.1,
which noted that "common law remedies had proved often ineffective." See, eg., Marshall v. Miller,
302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981).
97. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
98. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
99. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); see supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
100. Hardy, 288 N.C. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347. The misrepresentations included the following:
The automobile had 79,000 miles on it instead of the 21,000 registered on the odometer; the vehicle
had been sold twice before, but was represented as having only one previous owner; and the pur-
chaser was not told that the automobile had been damaged in a collision. Id. at 304, 218 S.E.2d at
343.
101. 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
102. Id. at 92, 331 S.E.2d at 678.
1748 [Vol. 69
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
other financial improprieties.10 3 The defendant advertised that it "pre-
screened" job applicants, but failed to conduct a reference check or background
investigation with regard to any criminal activity by the job applicant. 104 The
court held that the plaintiff could recover for the defendant's false advertising
under section 75-1.1.105 In both Hardy and Winston Realty, the injured plaintiff
was a consumer of the defendant's goods or services. This is a significant dis-
tinction from Ellis, in which plaintiff Ellis Brokerage was not a consumer of
defendant Northern Star's products, but rather a conduit for its products. In the
cited cases the plaintiffs' direct reliance on the acts of the defendants necessi-
tated the broad protections of section 75-1.1 to provide the plaintiffs with re-
course. Conversely, in Ellis the alleged libel did not cause Ellis Brokerage to
rely on Northern Star, and Ellis did have an available common-law remedy.
The court did not address these differences and failed to explain its reliance on
the cited examples in reaching its conclusion. 106 The court's silence calls into
question the soundness of its holding.
Another concern prompted by the court's inclusion of libel per se in a busi-
ness context within section 75-1.1 is the danger that communications found to
be libelous may vary widely as to the degree of harm and injury they cause.
Justice Meyer reflected this concern by pointing out that the language found to
be libelous in Ellis was much less derogatory than statements the North Caro-
lina courts traditionally have found to be libelous in a business context.10 7
Viewing the libel in Ellis as occurring near the low end of the libel spectrum, in
terms of degree of imputed harm, the supreme court has paved the way for lower
courts to treat many business communications that, prior to Ellis, flowed with
impunity, as unfair acts under section 75-1.1. Communications between persons
engaged in business are undoubtedly activities within the realm of "commerce"
and thereby trigger analysis under section 75-1..108 The court's prior interpre-
tation of unfair acts in Johnson as those that are "immoral, unethical, oppres-
sive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers,"109 however,
provides little in the way of limitations. With the exception of "substantially
injurious to consumers," each of the delineated characteristics is subjective,
thereby providing minimal guidance. In the case of libel per se, an extremely
defamatory statement in a business context very well could fall under one or
more of those labels and have a devastating effect on a plaintiff. Such a strong
libel, however, certainly would be actionable for under a libel suit, which would
obviate the need for the protection of section 75-1.1. Ellis does not present such
a strong case and it is very difficult to label the Ellis language, "[w]e at Northern
103. Id. at 93, 331 S.E.2d at 679.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 97, 331 S.E.2d at 681.
106. The court's entire commentary was: "We have concluded, for example, that both false
advertising and fraud violate [§ 75-1.1].... [L]ike fraud and false advertising, a libelperse of a type
impeaching a party in its business activities is an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce in
violation of [§] 75-1.1." Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225-26, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
107. See supra note 91.
108. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
109. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 (1980).
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Star did not authorize such a price list," as satisfying the Johnson interpreta-
tion.110 The court failed to apply the useful test of "the impact the practice has
in the marketplace,"111 which appears to be minimal in the case of libel, due to
the infrequency of the transgression. Thus, the Ellis holding expands the appli-
cability of section 75-1.1, but provides no analytical framework to guide the
lower courts in determining what constitutes a violation of the statute.112
The holding that libel per se in a business context violates section 75-1.1 is
not significant simply because it classifies libel as an unfair or deceptive trade
practice. Rather, it is the attachment of automatic treble damages provided by
section 75-16 that provides the real bite. 113 If the court finds a violation of
section 75-1.1, it must treble the compensatory damages established by the
jury. 114 The legislative intent behind section 75-16 included a desire to increase
the economic feasibility of "bringing... an action where the possible money
damages are limited, and thus encourage[] private enforcement."' 1 5 In a libel
case such as Ellis, monetary damages would be "limited" to compensatory and
punitive damages-a sufficient common-law remedy. Providing the plaintiff
with the choice between a common-law remedy and automatically trebled actual
damages under section 75-16116 exceeds the legslative intent. The automatic
trebling does not take into account the nature of the particular transaction; in
Ellis for example, the existence of libel was strongly questioned. 117 Judicial de-
termination of libel is too uncertain a process to subject to automatic treble dam-
ages; the imposition of such damages could inequitably penalize a defendant.
A brief survey illustrates where the North Carolina unfair or deceptive
trade practices act stands in relation to the schemes of other states."I8 The stat-
utes of thirty-two states proscribe unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 119
Thirty-four states list certain acts or practices as unlawful; North Carolina does
not.' 20 Statutory lists serve the important function of providing predictability as
to potential liability for unfair trade practices. North Carolina is one of twenty
110. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129; see Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
111. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
112. For a list of the types of actiyities to which § 75-1.1 has been applied, see Note, Olivetti
Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc- Recovery of Lost Profits for a Violation of North Carolina
General Statutes Section 75-L1, 65 N.C.L. REv. 1169, 1178-79 (1987).
113. For the text of § 75-16, see supra note 3.
114. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-16 (1988).
115. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04.
116. A plaintiff may elect either a common-law remedy including punitive damages or trebled
actual damages under § 75-16, but not both. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. For an
examination of the availability of punitive or treble damages, see Note, Unfair Trade Practices and
Unfair Methods of Competition in North Carolina: Are Both Treble and Punitive Damages Availablefor Violations of Section 75-1.1?, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1139 (1984).
117. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 228-31, 388 S.E.2d at 132-34 (Meyer, J., dissenting); seesupra notes 86-91
and accompanying text.
118. For purposes of this summary, the District of Columbia is treated as a state.
119. See Leaffer & Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The
Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. RV. 521, 531, 560-64
app. (1980).
120. See id. Some of the state statutes that list unlawful practices also include a catch-all phrase
designed to include nonlisted practices. Id. at 531.
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states that make available double or treble plaintiff's actual damages in private
actions for injuries resulting from unfair or deceptive trade practices. 121 Among
the states that provide treble damages, only five, including North Carolina, pro-
vide mandatory treble damages. 122 Eighteen states have statutory provisions
specifically prohibiting disparagement or trade libel,123 while fourteen states rec-
ognize a common-law disparagement cause of action. 124 In ten states, including
North Carolina, a common-law libel cause of action allows plaintiffs to recover
for disparagement-type injuries, while in several other states, libel statutes pro-
vide for recovery. 125 Overall, North Carolina's unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices act, with its automatic treble damages and lack of statutory list, is broader
and more generous than the parallel acts of many other states; its common-law
remedy for disparagement or trade libel is on par with about half of the states.
Finally, application of the disparagement and unfair trade practice schemes
of three leading commercial states-California, New York, and Texas-to the
facts of Ellis yields significantly different results from those of the North Caro-
lina approach. In California there is an established common-law cause of action
for trade libel. 126 The cause of action requires a publication that induces others
not to deal with the plaintiff, as well as a showing of special damages. 127 Apply-
ing the facts of Ellis, the plaintiff could successfully bring such a cause of action
if it could prove that the letter from Northern Star injured its reputation and
thereby caused customers to terminate their business relationships. Under this
cause of action, Ellis Brokerage could recover specific lost sales and punitive
damages upon proof of actual damages. 128 This result parallels the one under
121. See UNFAIR CoMPErrrIoN, supra note 83 (includes "Trade Disparagement or Trade Libel"
subsections for each state).
122. The other four are California, Colorado, Hawaii, and New Jersey. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17082 (West 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-1-113(2)(a) (Supp. 1990) (treble damages or
$250, whichever is greater); HAw. REv. STAT. § 480-13(a)(1) (Supp. 1990) (treble damages or
$1000, whichever is greater); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 1989). In states with treble damages
that are not mandatory, such damages may be awarded at the discretion of the court, or for viola-
tions that are "knowing or intentional." Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 119, at 532.
123. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(7) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-88-106(a)(2)
(1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105(1)(h) (Supp. 1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532(a)(8)
(1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(g) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-372(a)(8), -393(b)(8) (1989
& Supp. 1990); HAw. REV. STAT. § 481A-3(a)(8) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 48-603(8) (Supp. 1990);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 312, § 2(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1212(1)(H) (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44(1)(8) (West Supp. 1991); NEn. REV. STAT.§ 87-302(a)(8) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REv. STAT. § 598.410(8) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-
2(D)(8) (Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(H) (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 78, § 53(a)(8) (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608(1)(h) (1989); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.46(b)(8) (Vernon 1987). A typical statute contains language that prohibits "disparaging
the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact." IDAHO
CODE § 48-603(8) (Supp. 1990). An example of a more explicit statute, which leaves less room for
misinterpretation, is: "It shall be a violation of this chapter, whether or not any consumer is in fact
misled, deceived or damaged thereby, for any person to... disparage the goods, services or business
of another by false or misleading representations of material facts." D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(g)
(1981).
124. See UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 83.
125. Id.
126. Id. at CA-18.1.
127. Id. at CA-19.
128. Id.
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the North Carolina common-law libel cause of action.129 Application of Cali-
fornia's unfair and deceptive trade practices act provides different results, how-
ever. The act contains a broad statement of scope, 130 like North Carolina, and it
also provides mandatory treble damages. 13 1 The important distinction, how-
ever, is that under California's law only consumers and direct competitors may
bring actions. 132 Thus, a California plaintiff in the situation of Ellis Brokerage
would be entitled to equitable common-law damages but not statutory treble
damages, unlike the result in North Carolina.
New York has a common-law cause of action for disparagement that re-
quires a showing of malice, falsity of the statement, and special damages. 133
Since there is no indication that the statement made by Northern Star was false,
it is unlikely that Ellis Brokerage would succeed under New York's disparage-
ment cause of action. Like North Carolina, New York also has a broadly
worded deceptive trade practices act that provides a private cause of action for
both consumers and other persons injured by violations.1 34 This consumer-ori-
ented act, however, limits remedies to the greater of actual damages or fifty
dollars, and places a cap on discretionary treble damages of $1000.135 Under
the facts of Ellis, a best-case scenario for the plaintiff in New York would be
recovery of $32,500 in actual damages plus $1000 in discretionary treble dam-
ages-well below the $97,500 provided by North Carolina law. 136
Texas recognizes a common-law cause of action for disparagement that pro-
tects "the economic interests of the injured party against pecuniary lOSS."'1 3 7
Disparagement requires "publication... falsity, malice, lack of privilege, and
special damages."138 The Ellis facts likely would not satisfy the element of fal-
sity and therefore would not lead to recovery of damages for lost profits, which
are available under the cause of action.139
129. See supra text accompanying note 24.
130. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17001 (West 1987). The statute provides in part that the
purpose of the act is to "foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, decep-
tive, destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is
destroyed or prevented." Id.
131. Id. § 17082.
132. Id. §§ 17021, 17070; see Harris v. Capitol Records Distrib. Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454, 460-61,
413 P.2d 139, 143-44, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543-44 (1966) (requiring that a competitor be in "primary"
or direct competition with wrongdoer in order to bring an action under California's Unfair Practices
Act).
133. UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 83, at NY-23.
134. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1988).
135. Discretionary treble damages will only be awarded if a violation of the statute is willful or
knowing. UNFAIR COMPETrION, supra note 83, at NY-8.
136. The best-case scenario is unlikely, as the courts have interpreted the scope of New York's
deceptive practices act to exclude "private, non-consumer transactions of a non-recurring type with-
out implications for the public." Id. at NY-7; see Genesco Entertainment v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743,
752 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Arguably, a transaction like that of Ellis would not meet the limited interpre-
tation of the scope of the act, since it was between business entities (food supplier, broker, and
institutional buyers), and was a one-time communication. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19.
137. Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987). There is a separate
cause of action for defamation, which is intended "to protect the personal reputation of the injured
party." Id.
138. Id.
139. UNFAIR COMPETrmON, supra note 83, at TX-38.1 to TX-38.2.
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The Texas deceptive trade practices act includes a broad prohibition against
any "[flalse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce," as well as a list of twenty-four acts considered per se false,
misleading, or deceptive. 140 Included among the enumerated acts is "disparag-
ing the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representa-
tion of facts." 141 The cause of action provided by the statute is available to
"consumers," with "consumer" defined as "an individual, partnership, corpora-
tion.., who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." 14 2
Remedies for an injured consumer include actual damages and discretionary
treble damages "[i]f the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was
committed knowingly." 143 Thus, unlike North Carolina's scheme, the Texas
statutory scheme is explicit as to its inclusion of disparagement as a violation
and does not mandate automatic treble damages. A plaintiff such as Ellis Bro-
kerage could recover treble damages nearly equivalent to those provided by the
North Carolina statute, but only if the defendant's conduct was intentional. The
application of the Ellis scenario to appropriate law in California, New York, and
Texas illustrates that North Carolina's statutory scheme is out of step, due to its
combination of broadness and unconditional, unlimited treble damages.
When the general assembly enacted North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tions 75-1.1 and 75-16, it intended to "provide civil means to maintain ethical
standards of dealings between persons engaged in business and the consuming
public... and to enable a person injured by [unfair or] deceptive acts or prac-
tices to recover ... damages from a wrongdoer." 144 The legislature created a
repository into which the courts could selectively place practices deemed to be
unfair or deceptive through the continuous process of judicial inclusion and ex-
clusion. The legislature also provided a substantial remedy for injured parties in
the form of treble damages. Standing apart from all but a handful of states, 145
the legislature implemented, and the courts have enforced, automatic treble
damages. While this protection provides sufficient recourse for injured parties,
and actually may improve the ethics of the marketplace, there is the potential for
the protection to become too restrictive. The decision of the supreme court in
Ellis is a step in that direction. With brevity and minimal justification, and with-
out any analysis of marketplace impact, the court added libel per se in a business
context to the stockpile of unfair acts. In so doing, the court displayed an eager-
ness to expand section 75-1.1 to include a practice that already had sufficient
140. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987).
141. Id. § 17.46(b)(8).
142. Id. § 17.45(4). The term "consumer" excludes a "business consumer" with assets of $25
million or more, or under the ownership or control of a corporation or entity with assets of $25
million or more. Id.
143. Id. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The statute defines the discretionary treble damages
as "[no] more than three times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1000." Id.
144. Hardy v. Toler, 24 N.C. App. 625, 630-31, 211 S.E.2d 809, 813, modified on other grounds,
288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975). For the statement of this intent in the original version of§ 75-
1.l(b), see supra note 78.
145. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
1991] 1753
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
remedies under common law. 146 This willingness to summarily expand protec-
tions in commerce could ultimately have a chilling effect on business transac-
tions and the marketplace in general. North Carolina should consider the
protective, yet more moderate, unfair trade practice schemes of other states that
are leaders in commerce.147
One option for improving the effectiveness of section 75-1.1 would be for
the North Carolina General Assembly to clarify the statute by expressly includ-
ing or excluding of particular practices. By amending the statute in that way,
the legislature would provide warning to potential transgressors as well as con-
crete guidance to the courts. Alternatively, the legislature might consider imple-
menting discretionary treble damages instead of the automatic treble damages of
section 75-16. Discretionary trebling would eliminate the harshness of uni-
formly applying treble damages to all unfair trade practices, regardless of the
nature of a particular act, while retaining the penalty for egregious acts.
In the absence of any legislative action, the onus will fall on the North
Carolina judiciary to effectively define the parameters of the statute. The courts
should view each decision involving the statute as an opportunity to clarify the
analytical framework for determining what constitutes an unfair or deceptive
trade practice. The courts should include in this framework an analysis of the
impact the alleged violation has upon the marketplace. This analysis should
consider the availability of remedies through other causes of action, as well as
the derivative effects of automatic treble damages; the Ellis court ignored these
considerations. It is imperative that the courts carry out the process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion with a high degree of care and strike a balance between
over-inclusion and over-exclusion. Failure to do so will have a detrimental im-
pact on the commercial climate in North Carolina.
PAUL M. SARACENI
146. The expansion occurred in a case in which the court's standard for libel was particularly
lenient. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
1754 [Vol. 69
